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Sensorstechforum.com investigation — A recently surfaced phishing-as-a-service (PhaaS) kit dubbed Tykit has been weaponizing SVG attachments since May 2025 to steal corporate Microsoft 365 credentials. The kit blends multi-stage redirection, heavily obfuscated JavaScript, and anti-bot checks to dodge automated scanning, funneling victims to convincingly spoofed Microsoft login portals.

Why SVG Files? The Misunderstood “Image” Vector
- SVG is XML-based and can legally include scripts and event handlers. Attackers embed JavaScript that executes on open/view, turning a seemingly harmless graphic into a redirector or a full phishing page.
- Many secure email gateways and attachment filters still treat SVGs like static images, performing shallow MIME checks instead of deep content inspection, which helps malicious samples slip through.
- Industry tracking in 2025 highlighted a surge in SVG-based lures across enterprise mailboxes, prompting platform changes and new detections.
Anatomy of a Tykit Attack
- Stage 1 — Delivery via SVG: The email lure (invoice, payroll slip, project asset) carries an SVG attachment or link. Inside, the attacker hides a JavaScript payload that reconstructs itself at runtime (e.g., XOR/string-split techniques) and fires a silent redirect when opened.
- Stage 2 — “Trampoline” Redirect: Victims are shuttled to an intermediate page (“trampoline”) that runs lightweight checks and sometimes displays a decoy prompt (e.g., “enter the last 4 digits of your phone”). The parameterized URL often includes a base64-encoded email to personalize the flow.
- Stage 3 — Anti-bot Gate: The chain commonly shows an anti-automation widget (e.g., Cloudflare Turnstile) to frustrate scanners and create legitimacy before the final hand-off.
- Stage 4 — Fake Microsoft 365 Login: A polished replica page validates email formats and nudges users to re-enter credentials if “incorrect.”
- Stage 5 — Real-time Exfiltration: Credentials are posted to attacker APIs (e.g.,
/api/validate,/api/login), with responses guiding the user journey (success, error, or re-try). Infrastructure overlaps observed across campaigns indicate reuse of a shared kit.
What’s at Stake
- Credential theft → downstream compromise: Email, OneDrive, SharePoint, Teams, and other M365 workloads become accessible to intruders.
- Business Email Compromise (BEC): Stolen accounts fuel internal spear-phishing, invoice fraud, and executive impersonation.
- Lateral movement: Attackers leverage valid creds to pivot, escalate privileges, and stage ransomware or data theft.
Known Indicators & Patterns (Defanged)
- Domain pattern:
segy*— recurring strings in Tykit C2/exfil domains (e.g.,segy[.]example), useful for pivoting and retro-hunting. - File artifacts: SVGs with embedded, obfuscated JavaScript; frequent runtime reconstruction (e.g., XOR); usage of
evalafter decoding. - Network behavior: Multi-hop redirects; POST requests to
/api/validateand/api/loginendpoints; occasional secondary logging endpoints like/x.php. - UX tells: Light-blue “modal”-style SVG art with dashed borders has been observed in some waves as a visual distractor during background execution.
Detection Playbook (SOC/IR)
- Email/Attachment filtering: Treat SVGs as active content. Enable deep content inspection and sandbox detonation for SVGs; block or quarantine where business-justification is weak.
- Behavioral telemetry: Alert on client-side redirects from SVG renders; JavaScript reconstruction/eval in SVG contexts; dev-tools blocking and right-click suppression on pages reached post-SVG.
- Network monitoring: Flag unfamiliar domains matching
segy*and similar kit clusters. Inspect sequences of 302s culminating in M365 look-alike hosts. - Threat intelligence: Continuously enrich with fresh IOCs, and pivot from a single artifact (domain pattern, hash, landing path) to related infrastructure.
Prevention & Hardening (Security Leaders)
- Enforce strong MFA and Zero Trust: Conditional access, sign-in risk evaluation, and phishing-resistant methods limit credential utility even if harvested.
- Least privilege & segmentation: Reduce blast radius when an identity is compromised.
- Attachment policy: Sanitize or block risky formats (including SVG) for groups that don’t need them; prefer safe viewers that strip active content.
- User experience controls: Consider mail client/server policies that suppress inline SVG rendering; educate users that “image” files can execute logic.
- Response readiness: Practice account lock/reset, OAuth app review, mailbox rule purge, and token revocation for suspected phish incidents.
Rapid Triage Checklist
- Search mailboxes, gateways, and EDR for SVG attachments delivered around the alert window.
- Hunt for redirection chains where the first referer is a local
file://or email-origin SVG view. - Query proxy/DNS for
segy*lookups, and for POSTs to/api/validate//api/loginon non-Microsoft domains. - Inspect suspicious pages for anti-bot widgets and dev-tools suppression; capture DOM to recover obfuscated scripts.
- Reset affected accounts, revoke sessions/tokens, review mailbox rules and OAuth grants, and enable/step-up MFA.
References & Further Reading
- ANY.RUN overview of Tykit and related IOCs — “Tykit: Phishing kit Overview”
- ANY.RUN campaign analysis across sectors — “Tykit Analysis: New Phishing Kit …”
- Report on Tykit’s SVG lure and template consistency — SC World coverage
- Context: Why SVG is attractive to phishers — Cloudflare research
- Microsoft/industry context on SVG-phish and anti-bot gates — Microsoft Threat Intelligence, TechRadar (Outlook SVG change)
Tykit samples and IOCs: Start pivots with the pattern domainName:"segy*" in your threat intel platform. Defang domains when sharing, and enrich with passive DNS, TLS certs, and WHOIS overlaps.
Got new Tykit samples or fresh IOCs? Tip us at Sensorstechforum.com.

